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ABSTRACT  
This paper explores the cost structure of Swiss hospitals, focusing on differences due 
to teaching activities and those related to ownership and subsidization types. A 
stochastic total cost frontier with a Cobb-Douglas functional form has been estimated 
for a panel of 148 general hospitals over the six-year period from 1998 to 2003. 
Inpatient cases adjusted by DRG cost weights and ambulatory revenues are 
considered as two separate outputs. The adopted econometric specification allows for 
unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals. The results suggest that teaching activities 
are an important cost driving factor and hospitals that have a broader range of 
specialization are relatively more costly. The excess costs of university hospitals can 
be explained by more extensive teaching activities as well as the relative complexity 
of the offered medical treatments from a teaching point of view. However, even after 
controlling for such differences university hospitals have shown a relatively low cost-
efficiency especially in the first two or three years of the sample period. The analysis 
does not provide any evidence of significant efficiency differences across 
ownership/subsidy categories.  
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1. Introduction 
The increasing growth of health care costs in Switzerland has raised the public 
interest in identifying the possibilities of improvement in productive efficiency. 
General hospitals (specialized clinics excluded) that account for about a quarter of 
national health expenditures have been subject of much debate but few studies. Farsi 
and Filippini (2006) and Steinmann and Zweifel (2003) have found significant 
differences in productivity and cost-efficiency among hospitals. Identifying the 
sources of such differences is an important policy issue that has not been explored 
sufficiently.  
Ownership and subsidization as well as research and teaching activities have 
been considered as important cost-driving factors among Swiss hospitals. University 
hospitals have been often criticized for being excessively costly. Many policy-makers 
believe that public and subsidized hospitals are not as efficient as private facilities. 
However these policy debates remain qualitative and lack sufficient empirical 
evidence.  
The present study addresses the above issues using data form a national 
sample of 148 general hospitals operating from 1998 to 2003. Compared to the 
previous research on Swiss hospitals this paper benefits from a larger data set and 
several additional variables especially those related to teaching activities. Moreover, 
the adopted methodology is based on some of the recent developments in stochastic 
frontier panel data models.  
The analysis indicates that teaching activities can explain part of cost 
differences among hospitals. The results suggest that university hospitals while 
showing relatively high inefficiency, have improved over the sample period. There is 
no evidence of statistically significant efficiency differences among various 
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ownership/subsidy types. The estimation results also point to unexploited economies 
of scale in a majority of the studied hospitals.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general 
description of the adopted methodology with discussions of the functional form and 
econometric models. Section 3 describes the model specification. The data and 
descriptive statistics are given in Section 4. The estimation results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Methodology  
Though many authors (Zuckerman et al., 1994; Linna, 1998; Rosko, 2001) 
have used cost frontier models to evaluate hospitals’ efficiency, the application of 
such models in the health-care sector has been criticized (Newhouse, 1994; Skinner, 
1994). The main arguments against these models are related to the unobserved 
heterogeneity due to differences in case-mix and quality of care as well as the errors 
incurred by aggregation of outputs. Horrace and Schmidt (1996), Jensen (2000) and 
Street (2003) have highlighted the sensitivity issues in the efficiency ranking of 
individual firms, which has been considered the frontier models’ main objective.  
Virtually all frontier models rely on an assumption that the inefficiencies can 
be represented by certain asymmetric component of the stochastic error term. Such 
assumptions provide a convenient practical basis for separating the random noise 
from the inefficiency term. Moreover, they are often based on a sensible distribution 
assumption that assigns relatively high likelihood to full efficiency, thus providing a 
basis for comparison of individual firms with the bulk of the sample. However, it 
should be noted that these assumptions are in principle non-testable, and as pointed 
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out by Street (2003), might create sensitivity problems for they link the identification 
of inefficiencies to the skewness of the residuals to a certain direction.  
Admitting the difficulties involved in identifying the individual firm’s relative 
efficiency, other studies (Folland and Hofler, 2001; Hadley and Zuckerman, 1994; 
Farsi et al., 2005) show the practical use of stochastic frontier analysis for comparing 
the performance across groups of providers. In addition, the new developments in 
stochastic frontier models for panel data proposed by Greene (2005) provide a better 
account of the hospital-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Following this thread of 
literature, we adopt a stochastic cost frontier approach to explore the efficiency 
differences across hospital types. The null hypothesis posits a similar distribution of 
inefficiency across different types, while the alternative suggests that hospital types 
differ in cost-efficiency perhaps due to various incentive mechanisms e.g. 
ownership/subsidy status, or differences in objective functions such as teaching and 
research purposes in university hospitals.  
 
Functional form 
Griffin et al. (1987) provide a comprehensive list of alternative functional forms and 
propose a series of criteria for model selection in cost and production analyses. The 
most important restrictions are related to the sample size and the estimation method. 
As the number of variables increase, most functional forms require a geometrically 
increasing number of parameters, thus necessitate much larger samples. The optimal 
choice is therefore a functional form that can be estimated with available estimation 
procedures and limits the number of parameters while using as many relevant 
variables as possible. One of the most commonly used functional forms is the Cobb-
Douglas (log-linear) model (cf. Greene, 2004, 2003; Linna, 1998). Thanks to its 
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limited number of variables this form has a practical advantage in estimation and 
interpretation, over more complicated forms. The main shortcoming of this model is 
the assumption of constant rate of scale economies which is considered as restrictive 
because by using the same proportional increase in output, small companies usually 
gain more than large firms.  
 The potential changes in scale elasticity with output can be analyzed using 
flexible functional forms such as translog. However, a translog model requires the 
estimation of a large number of parameters. Furthermore, the included second-order 
terms could cause multicollinearity, which can affect the model’s statistical 
performance. Especially with the multiple error component model used in this study 
and the available sample size, such problems could induce numerical problems 
resulting in degenerate stochastic terms. In fact, our preliminary analyses showed that 
a numerically feasible estimation of a translog cost frontier with non-degenerate 
stochastic components was only possible with simplified specifications that excluded 
several important output characteristics.  
 Using a parsimonious translog model with a homothetic cost function and its 
corresponding Cobb-Douglas model, we performed an exploratory analysis to identify 
the effect of functional form on the results. The results indicate that: first, the main 
estimated coefficients do not change much across the two functional forms. 
Particularly, the main output coefficients used for estimating the scale economies are 
quite similar to those of the complete model used here. Secondly, the efficiency 
estimates obtained from the translog model are highly correlated (higher than 90%) 
with those of the corresponding parsimonious Cobb-Douglas model. The main 
differences in efficiency estimates appeared when we included the deleted variables 
and more importantly with a change in econometric specification. These results 
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suggest that in our case the choice of explanatory variables and the econometric 
specification of unobserved heterogeneity have a greater importance than the 
functional form. We therefore decided to focus on the Cobb-Douglas form that allows 
a larger number of explanatory variables.  
 Resulting from a minimization problem given input prices and outputs, cost 
functions must be non-decreasing in outputs and concave and linearly homogeneous 
in input prices (Cornes, 1992). In particular, the latter condition is usually imposed by 
dividing the input prices by a numeraire price, thus ensuring the input shares add up to 
1. In this paper, this condition is not imposed mainly because as we will see later, the 
available data does not allow a complete account of all input factors. 
 
Econometric models 
There are a number of econometric approaches to estimate stochastic cost 
frontier models (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The original cost frontier model 
(Aigner et al., 1977) applied to panel data can be written as:  
  1 1 1l n ( , . . . , ; , . . . , ; , . . . , )i t i t M i t i t N i t i t K i t i t i tT C f Y Y P P Z Z u v= + +  (1) 
where subscripts i and t represent the firm and year respectively; TC is the total costs; 
Ym (m=1, … , M) are the outputs; Pn (n=1, …, N) are the input factor prices; Zk (k=1, 
... , K) are output characteristics and other exogenous factors that may affect costs; vit 
is the random noise or unobserved heterogeneity; and uit is a positive stochastic term 
representing inefficiency, typically with a normal-half-normal distribution: 
2 2 ~ (0, ) , ~ (0, ).it u it vu N v Nσ σ  The firm’s inefficiency is estimated using the 
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conditional mean of the inefficiency term as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982), that 
is: ˆE it itu ε⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , where it it itu vε = + .  
Assuming a time-invariant inefficiency term uit=ui, this term can be identified 
by panels’ individual fixed or random effects. The resulting specifications (Pitt and 
Lee, 1981; Schmidt and Sickles, 1984) relax the distribution assumptions on 
stochastic terms, in particular in the fixed effect specification the individual firm 
effects (ui) do not need to be uncorrelated with explanatory variables. Several authors 
(Battese and Coelli, 1992; Cornwell et al., 1990: Sickles, 2005) have extended the 
above panel data models to include time-variant inefficiency. Others (Greene, 2004, 
2005; Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1995; Kumbhakar; 1991; Polachek and Yoon, 
1996) have adopted another approach in which a stochastic firm-specific term (fixed 
or random effect) is added into the original stochastic frontier model presented in 
Equation (1). This approach allows a distinction of unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity across firms, which is particularly important in hospitals characterized 
by strong unobserved heterogeneity associated with case mix and quality differences.  
In particular the random intercept frontier model (‘true’ random effects 
frontier model) proposed by Greene (2004, 2005) has been successfully used in other 
sectors (Farsi et al., 2005). This model can be obtained by adding a firm-specific 
stochastic term 2i (0, )N αα σ∼ , on the right-hand-side of Equation (1). As opposed to 
alternatives with fixed effects, this model does not have the incidental parameters 
problem. The main difficulty of this model is in its numerically cumbersome 
estimation method. As the likelihood function does not have a closed from, this model 
is estimated using Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) method, in which iα ’s are 
simulated by random draws. Because of non-linearity of errors in the number of 
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simulations, the SML estimators require a large number of simulations or might show 
sensitivity to the draws (Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996).  
In this paper, we use the Greene’s true random effect frontier model, labeled 
here as TRE. We use pseudo-random Halton draws to minimize the potential 
sensitivity of the results to simulations. Number of draws has been fixed to 1000. Our 
sensitivity analysis using several options suggested that the estimations are not 
sensitive when the number of draws is higher than a few hundred. The inefficiency is 
estimated using the (simulated) conditional mean of the inefficiency term (uit) given 
by ˆE it itu ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , where it i it itu vω α= + + . In addition to the TRE model, we estimated the 
original pooled frontier model as shown in Equation (1). The contrasting difference 
between the two models is that unlike the pooled model, in the TRE specification, the 
persistent cost differences are excluded from inefficiency estimates. In this sense the 
two models can be used to provide complementary estimates of persistent and 
transient inefficiencies.  
 
Differences across ownership/subsidization types 
Although, economic theory predicts lower costs for organizations with 
relatively high-powered financial incentives such as for-profit and non-subsidized 
firms, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. While some studies (Eakin, 1991; 
Steinmann and Zweifel, 2003) conclude no significant differences, a few others (Li 
and Rosenman, 2001; Carey, 1997) report slightly lower costs in for-profit hospitals 
compared to non-profit ones. In this paper, the effects of ownership/subsidization 
status on efficiency are studied using a two-stage method. This method is based on 
testing the significance of differences across hospital groups. We use the Kruskal-
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Wallis (1952) rank test (KW) as well as the t-test with unequal variances. The KW 
test is a non-parametric test that has been often used in frontier analysis (Singh and 
Coelli, 2001). Given that the hospital types are more or less constant over the sample 
period (no change in subsidy status and only 9 cases of ownership change), the tests 
have also been performed on the hospital average values over the sample period but 
have not shown much difference in the outcome.  
The two-stage approach has a disadvantage in that the first-stage estimation 
errors may affect the results of the test in the second-stage. These errors may lead to 
an under-rejection of the null hypothesis postulating similar cost-efficiencies across 
different categories (Farsi and Filippini, 2004). On the other hand, the two-stage 
approach allows the use of non-parametric statistical tests based on efficiency ranks 
rather than efficiency values that are subject to relatively large estimation errors and 
sensitive to outliers. An alternative approach is to include type indicators in the 
regressions and test the significance of the corresponding coefficients. We performed 
a GLS estimation of this alternative specification to confirm the results of the two-
stage procedures. Our data show that the subsidization status has not changed over the 
sample period and only 9 hospitals have changed ownership status from one year to 
another.  
 
3. Model specification 
The specification used in this study is based on two main outputs: 
hospitalizations and ambulatory care. In line with Linna (1998), Rosko (2001) and 
Heshmati (2002) the main measure of hospitalization output is taken as a DRG 
weighted number of hospitalizations (denoted by Y). This approach was prefered over 
the alternative based on multiple output categories based on DRG weights (Brown, 
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2003), mainly because such categories might be arbitrary as the DRG weights define 
the cost intensity of the cases rather than different outputs.  
Since the number of outpatient cases is not available in the data, the 
ambulatory output is approximated by the corresponding revenues adjusted for 
inflation (AMB). This approximation is based on the assumption that the average unit 
price of ambulatory care is similar across hospitals. Three input factors are 
considered: capital, physicians’ input and all other employees’ labor. Similar to 
Wagstaff and Lopez (1995) and Rosko (2001), capital prices (PK), are approximated 
by the hospital’s total capital expenditure divided by the number of available beds in 
the hospital.  
Labor prices (PL1 and PL2) are calculated by dividing total salaries by the 
number of remunerated days. In line with Folland and Hofler (2001) and Scuffham et 
al. (1996) among others, physicians and non-physicians are considered as two 
separate labor inputs. The physicians’ labor price represents the average salary of 
those employed by the hospital and exclude honoraries and fees, accounting on 
average for about 5% of the hospital’s total costs, usually paid to both employed and 
unemployed physicians. Both labor prices are proportionally adjusted for social 
benefits, accounting on average, for about 9% of total costs. These charges are 
proportionally distributed to physician and non-physician groups, the proportions 
being the respective shares of each group’s salaries. This adjustment captures the 
potential variation in social benefits across hospitals due to differences in pension 
funds as well as the age and seniority of the employees mix. 
The three input factor prices considered in the model correspond to about 70 
percent of a hospital’s total cost on average. The available data do not allow an 
appropriate calculation of the prices of remaining inputs such as medical materials, 
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food, water and power as well as physicians’ fees and other personnel charges. The 
excluded prices are obviously not constant and neglecting their variation could affect 
the estimation results. However, some of these variations are probably captured by the 
three included factor prices. For instance, physicians’ fees are likely to be correlated 
with physicians’ salaries. Another concern is the accuracy of the price data that may 
create bias in the price coefficients. However, other coefficients will not be affected if 
these measurement errors and the unobserved factor prices are uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables.  
Similar to Vita (1990), Scuffham et al. (1996) and Carey (1997) the average 
length of hospitalization (LOS) has been included in the model. In addition to 
representing hospital’s ‘hotel services’ like nursing care and accommodation (Breyer, 
1987), this variable provides a measure of severity of the case mix within each DRG. 
In fact, there is a considerable variation among patients within a DRG, as indicated by 
the wide range of acceptable hospital stays provided by the Swiss DRG Association 
(APDRG Suisse, 2003). The number of hospital departments (medical units MU) is 
also included to represent the range of specializations offered in the hospitals. Each 
one of these centers provides a single specialization. Hospitals with a wider variety of 
medical specializations are expected to be more costly than those with similar output 
but from fewer specializations. Another cost-driver is the number of non-medical 
units (TU) including medico-technical, therapeutic and infrastructure units. The 
operation costs of these units are also included in the observed total costs.  
The share of outpatient clinics over total medical units (AMBC) operated by 
the hospital is also included as a complementary measure of ambulatory output in the 
model. The level of hospital’s teaching activities is measured by the total number of 
internship positions (NP) offered in the hospital. The internships might have different 
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levels of complexity and specialization. In order to account for such differences we 
used the Swiss Medical Association’s classification that applies to internship positions 
and hospital departments. We included the percentage of the internship positions 
recognized as the two top categories (AB) and that of the hospital’s departments 
accredited for specialized medical training (FMH). These two variables are expected 
to represent the complexity level of the hospital’s medical care.     
Hospitals’ costs can also be affected by the quality of care. The evidence on 
the effect of quality measures on hospital costs is not conclusive. Zuckermann et al 
(1994), Rosko (2001) and Vitaliano and Toren (1996) conclude that quality indicators 
do not have significant cost effects, whereas others such as Folland and Hofler (2001) 
suggest a significant effect for structural quality measures such as bed availability and 
the share of board-certified physicians. This may be explained by the fact that unlike 
outcome or process measures the structural quality is usually easier to observe and has 
a more directly measurable effect on costs. As we do not have access to patient-level 
data or any reliable outcome measure quality from Swiss hospitals, in this paper we 
focus on structural measures of quality. In addition to the share of accredited medical 
units and training positions, we included the hospital’s nurse per bed ratio (NB) to 
represent the quality of nursing care.  
We also included two binary indicators for emergency room (ER) and 
geriatrics department (GER). While emergency services are usually involved with 
relatively severe cases, geriatrics cases are less intensive in medical care thus less 
costly. Year dummies (Y99 through Y03) are included to capture the overall 
technological progress and the potential temporal variations in unobserved variables 
such as reporting procedures. 
The specification of the true random effects model can therefore be written as:  
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  (2) 
The stochastic components αi, uit and vit respectively represent the hospital-specific 
random effect, inefficiency term and random noise with a normal-half-normal 
distribution. The pooled model is a special case, in which the stochastic component αi 
is set equal to zero.  
 The above specification leaves out several important factors. Namely the 
available data do not provide any measure of severity variation for outpatients and 
those within each DRG or a better measure of hospital’s ambulatory output especially 
the ER visits. More importantly, the model lacks an outcome measure of less 
observable quality differences across hospitals. Assuming that these unobserved 
factors are independent of the included explanatory variables, their omission does not 
bias the results. However, this might be a restrictive assumption as in many cases, the 
correlation between those differences and hospital size or type is rather plausible. For 
instance, assuming a positive relation between costs and quality, higher unobservable 
quality for non-profit hospitals would imply an overestimation of their inefficiency 
compared to other hospital types. The results of this paper should therefore be 
considered within the limits of the available data and the related simplifying 
assumptions.     
 
4. Data 
The data used in this paper are extracted from the annual financial and 
administrative data reported by general hospitals to the Federal Statistical Office 
(SFSO, 1997a) from 1998 to 2003. These data have been merged with another data set 
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consisting of an aggregate extraction of the medical data of the Swiss hospitals with 
records for individual hospitalizations (SFSO, 1997b). The extracted medical data 
consist of the number of cases by AP-DRG in each hospital-year, including about a 
million observations. Using the cost weights from Swiss AP-DRG version 4.0 
(APDRG Suisse, 2003), we calculated an average cost weight for each hospital-year. 
The adjusted number of admissions is then calculated by multiplying these average 
cost weights by the number of admissions recorded in the administrative data. 
After excluding the observations with missing and invalid values from an 
unbalanced panel with 1082 observations from 221 general hospitals, the final sample 
was created with 623 observations from 148 hospitals operating from 1998 through 
2003. The excluded observations are mainly those with missing DRG data or 
erroneous values for outpatient revenues. We also excluded three hospitals with fewer 
than 20 beds. In general, the excluded observations with missing or suspicious values 
include higher proportion of small-size hospitals. T-tests suggest that the excluded 
observations are from hospitals with significantly lower number of beds (an average 
of 110 beds). However, similar tests indicate that there is no significant difference in 
average cost per hospitalization across the two groups. A descriptive summary of the 
sample listed in Table 1, shows a considerable variation among hospitals in most 
variables. Particularly while the average cost of a hospitalization varies from 4,500 to 
54,000 Francs, the average DRG cost weight ranges from .52 to 1.47 and an average 
hospitalization lasts from 4 to about 50 days.  
Insert Table 1 
The sample also includes all the five university hospitals in Switzerland. These 
hospitals stand out from the rest of the sample in several ways. With an average size 
of 1030 beds, DRG cost weight of 1.07, LOS of 8.3 days and an average cost of 
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19,700 Francs per hospitalization these hospitals are on average larger and treat a 
relatively severe patient mix with relatively short but expensive hospitalizations. 
These statistically significant differences (shown by t-test) might suggest the 
possibility of a different technology, hence a different cost function in university 
hospitals. However our preliminary regressions on a sample excluding the university 
hospitals indicate that the results do not change significantly, suggesting that these 
hospitals can be pooled with the rest of the sample. Moreover, the correlation between 
the efficiency estimates within each econometric model is higher than 98% between 
the samples with and without university hospitals.    
The number of general hospitals in the sample and their average capacity by 
ownership/subsidy types are listed in Table 2. All public hospitals and most private 
non-profit hospitals are subsidized, whereas in the private for-profit sector, a large 
fraction of hospitals are not. Table 2 also lists the average hospital size measured by 
the number of beds for each ownership/subsidy type. Public hospitals with an average 
of 262 beds are by far the largest providers of health care in the sample. Subsidized 
hospitals are also considerably larger than non-subsidized ones.  
Insert Table 2 
 
5. Results  
Table 3 lists the regression results of the cost frontier analysis as in Equation 
(2). The estimated coefficients are mostly significant and generally have the expected 
signs. Overall, the differences across the two models, while being statistically 
significant in many cases, are not considerable for practical purposes. The results 
especially those of the TRE model are also comparable to a similar model estimated 
by GLS given in the appendix (Table A.1). According to the TRE model a ceteris 
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paribus increase in the adjusted number of hospitalization by 1% will result in about 
0.7% increase in total costs. As expected, the effect of ambulatory output is much 
smaller, suggesting a marginal cost of about five times.  
Insert Table 3 
The regression results indicate that LOS is an important predictor of hospital 
costs. Given that hospital stays are on average about 10 days, this implies that a 
difference of one day in the hospital’s average LOS is approximately equivalent to 
4% of total costs. This could be considered as an important policy implication in the 
context of Switzerland, where local hospitals have been criticized for their excessively 
long hospitalizations. However, the apparently considerable savings by curtailing 
hospital stays should be considered with caution. First, the costs of medical treatment 
are not evenly distributed over the course of a hospitalization and the final days are 
usually less costly. Secondly, as confirmed by the smaller effect in the TRE model 
that has a better control for unobserved heterogeneity, LOS variable also captures part 
of the unobserved differences in case mix severity that are beyond the hospital 
management’s control.  
As expected, the price coefficients are positive and significant. However, these 
estimates significantly differ from the average actual share of the corresponding input 
factors (about 7, 11 and 53 percent for capital, physician services and other 
employees). This result can be related to the fact that because of labor contracts and 
other institutional and practical restrictions hospitals are not fully responsive to 
changes in input prices. This might imply that hospitals do not completely minimize 
their total costs. It should also be noted that hospitals might have other objectives in 
addition to cost minimization, in which case functions based on cost optimization can 
still be used as a “behavioral” cost functions and can be helpful in studying the firms’ 
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behavior rather than their production technological characteristics (Breyer, 1987; Bös, 
1986).  
As seen in Table 3, the number of hospital units has a significant effect on 
total costs, suggesting that hospitals with a wider range of specialization and also 
those with more non-medical services are relatively more costly. However the 
estimated coefficients suggest that such cost differences are relatively small. The 
marginal cost of internship positions is also low but statistically significant. The 
results predict an average increase of 0.9% in total costs for 10% increase in the 
number of positions. The teaching quality regarding medical specialization has also a 
statistically significant effect on hospital costs, but the marginal effects remain quite 
low.  
The share of ambulatory clinics has a negative and significant effect, 
consistent with the fact that ambulatory visits are usually less costly than inpatient 
care. The TRE model suggests that for instance, an increase of 10 percentage points in 
the share of ambulatory clinics thus 10 points decrease in the share of inpatient units, 
results in a decrease of about 3% in the hospital’s total costs. The nurse per bed ratio 
has a relatively high and significant effect, indicating that the cost of nursing care is 
quite considerable. As expected, the ER dummy has a positive coefficient and the 
geriatrics dummy has a negative effect. The coefficients of the year dummies suggest 
a positive growth in hospital costs starting from 2000, with an average annual rate of 
1 to 3 percent.  
Regarding scale economies, the results listed in Table 3 indicate that the 
returns to scale (inverse of the main output elasticity) are on average significantly 
higher than 1 (1.4 or 1.6 depending on the model). This suggests that the majority of 
general hospitals in Switzerland do not fully exploit the potential scale economies. 
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However, it should be noted that these economies are likely to be marginal for large 
hospitals with more than 130 to 200 beds (Vita, 1990; Crivelli et al., 2001; Aletras, 
1999; Dranove, 1998).  
 
Overall cost-efficiency  
Table 4 provides a descriptive summary of the inefficiency scores estimated 
by the two models. The inefficiency scores obtained from the two models are 
significantly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.56 and a Spearman rank 
correlation of .53. According to the pooled model, the inefficiency is less than 8 
percent for half of the sample but a quarter of the studied hospitals show 11% or more 
excess costs. As expected, the pooled model’s estimates are generally higher than 
those of the TRE model that separates part of the hospital-specific heterogeneity. The 
latter model suggests that on average, about 6 percent of the hospital costs cannot be 
explained by the included explanatory variables or by a symmetric stochastic term.  
Noting that the “true” inefficiencies cannot be exactly identified, the estimated 
inefficiencies can be interpreted as the excess costs compared to the best observed 
practice provided that the omitted variables are captured by symmetric stochastic 
components. While we cannot favor one model over the other, we assert that given the 
important unobserved factors related to quality and case-mix severity the TRE model 
is likely to give a better picture of excess costs. On the other hand in the context of 
Swiss hospitals, because of strong regulation and institutional restrictions managers 
might be unable to adapt with changing conditions thus persistent inefficiencies might 
be relatively important. In this case the TRE model might understate the sector’s 
overall inefficiency.  
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Insert Table 4 
These inefficiency estimates are in general lower than those reported in 
previous studies for the Swiss hospitals (Farsi and Filippini, 2006; Steinmann and 
Zweifel, 2003; Steinmann et al., 2004). However, the differences can be explained by 
several additional characteristics included in this paper, such as teaching and 
specialization variables as well as a different methodology in separating heterogeneity 
from inefficiency differences. The results are comparable to similar estimates reported 
in the literature for the US hospitals, ranging from 5 to 15 percent (Zuckerman et al., 
1994; Folland and Hofler, 2001; Eakin, 1991), but differ from other studies 
particularly those on European samples, which estimate generally higher levels of 
inefficiency amounting to 20 to 30 percent (Linna, 1998; Wagstaff, 1989; Wagstaff 
and Lopez, 1995; Steinmann et al., 2004; Bruning and Register, 1989). It should be 
noted that even the seemingly low values estimated from the TRE model are 
equivalent to considerable excess costs amounting, for instance in 2003, to about 590 
million Francs out of the actual total costs of 10.7 billion Francs for the hospitals in 
the sample. The 6 percent average inefficiency is also equivalent to 2 or 3 years 
efficiency lag according to the efficiency targets set by the UK health care authorities 
(Jacobs and Dawson, 2003).  
 
Cost-efficiency in university hospitals  
The estimation results suggest that university hospitals are on average less 
efficient than other hospitals. However, this difference is not statistically significant in 
the TRE model. Excepting the university hospitals the average efficiency estimates do 
not show any significant changes over time. University hospitals however show a 
 20
different pattern with a relatively high inefficiency in the first years (1998 to 2000) 
and a decreasing trend over the sample period (Figure 1).  
Insert Figure 1 
Several t-tests on the university hospitals’ efficiency scores across different 
years suggest that the efficiency improvement in university hospitals is statistically 
significant. According to these estimates, from 1998 to 2003, university hospitals 
have considerably reduced their excessive costs. Part of these changes could be 
explained by the variation of case mix severity. In fact, the trends in AP-DRG cost 
weights suggest that the severity of the patient mix has grown relatively more in 
university hospitals (Figure 2). Over the sample period the average cost weight for 
university hospitals has increased from 0.99 to 1.17 whereas the corresponding 
change in other hospitals is from 0.78 to 0.84. Given that in Switzerland, DRG coding 
has been introduced in 1998, some of such increases might be related to changes in 
the quality of DRG coding especially in university hospitals that, having relatively 
severe cases, require a more elaborate coding practice. In this case the observed 
changes in efficiency of university hospitals could be an artifact of a different DRG 
coding.   
Insert Figure 2 
In order to explore the relationship between changes in severity and 
inefficiency, we estimated another model similar to Equation (2), with the only 
difference that the number of admissions is not adjusted for AP-DRG cost weights. 
The inefficiency estimates of this analysis still show a slight but still statistically 
significant improvement in university hospitals over the sample period. These results 
indicate that part of efficiency gains in university hospitals could be related to the fact 
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that these hospitals increasingly treat more severe cases. However, even if we assume 
that the observed severity trends are entirely related to gradual effect of better coding 
practices, the results still indicate that on average university hospitals have improved.  
 
Effects of ownership/subsidy types  
The average inefficiency estimates are listed by ownership and subsidization 
categories in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively for the pooled and TRE models. These 
results point to some differences among various hospital types. We explored the 
significance of these differences with several Kruskal-Wallis and t-tests. Several 
possible groupings have been considered. In summary, the TRE model’s inefficiency 
estimates do not show any statistically significant difference across hospital types. 
The estimates obtained from the pooled model are significant at 10% level only for a 
single case, suggesting a higher efficiency in subsidized versus non-subsidized 
hospitals. Overall, consistent with the results reported in previous studies (Farsi and 
Filippini, 2006; Steinmann and Zweifel, 2003), this analysis suggests that after 
controlling for other factors, subsidization and ownership do not have any significant 
effect on hospital costs. This is also confirmed by the GLS model in which the three 
type indicators remain statistically insignificant (Table A.1).  
Insert Table 5 
Insert Table 6 
 
6. Conclusions  
Using a stochastic cost frontier model we explored the cost-efficiency 
differences across various hospital types. Consistent with the previous studies, the 
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results point to considerable unexploited scale economies in a majority of the studied 
hospitals. The results also suggest that hospitals with a wider range of specializations 
are relatively more costly than those specializing in fewer categories of medical 
services. However, the cost differences resulting from specialization are limited to a 
few percentage points for a relatively large change in the number of services.  
The richer data compared to the previous studies on Swiss hospitals were used 
to identify the effect of teaching activities on hospital costs through the number of 
internships and measures of teaching accreditation. The results suggest that the 
considerable excess costs of university hospitals, reported in previous studies, can be 
explained by more extensive teaching activities in those hospitals as well as the 
relative complexity of the offered medical care as assessed for training purposes. 
However, our analysis indicates that even after controlling for such differences 
university hospitals have shown a relatively poor cost-efficiency in the first two or 
three years of the sample period. The results also point to a statistically significant 
improvement of efficiency of university hospitals over the sample period.  
Finally, the statistical tests do not provide any evidence of statistically 
significant efficiency differences across ownership and subsidization categories. This 
result has been confirmed by a panel data model that integrates the ownership/subsidy 
indicators. However, lack of evidence for significant efficiency advantage of one type 
over another might be restricted to the available data, thus should be considered with 
caution. In fact, the potential correlation between hospital types and other cost driving 
factors might mask the actual ownership/subsidy effects.  
The present analysis has two main shortcomings that call for further study. 
First, the available data do not allow for a sufficient account of differences regarding 
the quality of care and case-mix severity. Although the adopted econometric 
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specification accounts for unobserved hospital-specific heterogeneity through 
individual random effects, the potential correlation of omitted variables with hospital 
types is neglected. Secondly, the cost frontier model while having a practical 
convenience in comparing the individual hospitals with the “best” observed practice, 
prove to be sensitive to the model specification.   
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Figure 1: Efficiency trend in university hospitals 
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Figure 2: Average AP-DRG cost weight  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Hospital's total costs 
(CHF '000) 86'697 139'667 5'036 884'764 Emergency Room 0.9165
Number of hospitalizations 7'542 7'814 367 50'774 Geriatrics 0.5217
Number of hospitalizations
(AP-DRG adjusted) 6'555 7'825 208 49'251 Year 1998 0.1108
Average total cost per 
hospitalization (CHF '000) 10.17 4.53 4.39 53.78 Year 1999 0.1573
Average AP-DRG
cost weight 0.8224 0.1127 0.5204 1.4735 Year 2000 0.1846
Number of patient-days 63'148 63'309 4'997 410'140 Year 2001 0.1878
Average length of hospitalizations 
(days) 10.0 5.0 3.9 49.1 Year 2002 0.1878
Average length of full 
hospitalizations (days) a
11.0 4.9 4.5 49.1 Year 2003 0.1717
Hospiatl's outpatient revenues  
(CHF '000) 12'944 21'827 24 144'802
Private for-profit 
Hospital 0.0979
Hospital capacity 
(number of beds) 213.2 220.2 20 1277
Private non-profit 
hospital 0.3355
P K (capital price) 
CHF '000 per bed      
24.86 23.71 3.08 242.57 Public hospital 0.5666
P L  - physicians
b
(CHF per day) 
345.17 133.43 93.22 1'044.49 Subsidized hospital 0.9085
P L  - other employees
c
(CHF per day)       
177.48 32.73 76.82 320.02 University hospital 0.0385
Nurse per bed ratio 1.363 0.506 0.474 4.410
Number of hospital's medical 
service centers 31.7 17.0 4 81
Number of hospital's
non-medical units d
31.7 7.3 9 48
Number of postgraduate medical 
training position 45.6 95.4 1 583
Fraction of ambulatory clinics in 
medical units 0.1216 0.0822 0 0.4286
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH 0.2334 0.1904 0 0.8571
Fraction of accredited training 
positions (FMH types A and B) 0.6109 0.3553 0 1
Min. Dummy variables MeanContinuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Max.
 
 
- The sample includes 623 observations from 148 general hospitals (1998-2003).  
- All monetary values are adjusted by the global consumer price index relative to 2003 prices. 
- Semi-hospitalizations (shorter than 24 hours) are considered as one-day hospitalizations. 
a Excludes semi-hospitalizations (over-night hospital stays shorter than 24 hours). 
b Employed physicians' average salary, adjusted for social benefits and excludes fees. 
c Average salary (adjusted for social benefits) of all hospital employees except physicians. 
d Includes medicotechnical, therapeutic and infrastructure units. 
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Table 2: Number of hospitals and average size by ownership/subsidy (1998-2003) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE FOR-
PROFIT TOTAL
Hospitals 353 175 38 566
Hospital size (beds) 262 155 194 224
Hospitals 34 23 57
Hospital size (beds) 80 133 101
Hospitals 353 209 61 623
Hospital size (beds) 262 143 171 213
TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED
NON SUBSIDIZED -
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Table 3:  Estimation results 
0.6914* 0.6315*
(0.0152) (0.0069)
0.5100* 0.4023*
(0.0194) (0.0088)
0.1498* 0.1456*
(0.0093) (0.0037)
0.1211* 0.1225*
(0.0096) (0.0045)
0.0744* 0.0311*
(0.0179) (0.0085)
0.2333* 0.1533*
(0.0406) (0.0183)
0.2406* 0.1423*
(0.0262) (0.0118)
0.0380* 0.0573*
(0.0149) (0.0070)
-0.0321 0.0743*
(0.0358) (0.0179)
0.1003* 0.0882*
(0.0108) (0.0049)
-0.1747* -0.3037*
(0.0705) (0.0329)
0.0150 0.0476*
(0.0369) (0.0184)
0.0471* 0.0191
(0.0237) (0.0110)
-0.0727* 0.0279*
(0.0224) (0.0114)
-0.0345* -0.0281*
(0.0126) (0.0057)
-0.0168 -0.008
(0.0204) (0.0112)
0.0111 0.0128
(0.0204) (0.0096)
0.0313 0.0402*
(0.0200) (0.0100)
0.0525* 0.0604*
(0.0202) (0.0097)
0.0511* 0.0618*
(0.0207) (0.0099)
0.2081 1.2165*
(0.2418) (0.1097)
0.1378*
(0.0031)
0.1592* 0.0872*
(0.0002) (0.0036)
1.0698* 1.5521*
(0.1094) (0.2124)
Log Likelihood 391.59 610.19
 -
Pooled Model True RE Model
Average length of 
hospitalizations
Outpatient revenues
P K (capital price)     
P L  - physicians     
P L  - others         
Nurse per bed
Number of hospitalizations 
(AP-DRG adjusted)
Year 2002
Year 2003
Constant (α )
Number of 
medical units
Number of 
non-medical units
Number of 
training positions
Fraction of 
ambulatory clinics
λ =σ u /σ v
Fraction of training 
positions A and B
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH
Emergency Room
Geriatrics
Year 1999
Year 2000
σ
[where: σ 2 =σ u 2 +σ v 2 ]
σ α
Year 2001
 
 
* Significant at 5%; Standard errors are given in parentheses; Dependent variable is hospital's 
total costs in logs; All variables except dummies and the three fractions are in logarithms. 
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Table 4:  Descriptive summary of inefficiency estimates 
Pooled 0.0926 0.0401 0.0299 0.0656 0.0859 0.1084 0.3249
True RE 0.0568 0.0291 0.0114 0.0387 0.0502 0.0673 0.2622
1st 
Quartile
Median 3rd 
Quartile
Max.Model Mean Std. Dev. Min.
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Average inefficiency by ownership/subsidy type (pooled model) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE
FOR-PROFIT TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED 0.0896 0.0941 0.0983 0.0916
NON SUBSIDIZED  - 0.1099 0.0906 0.1021
TOTAL 0.0896 0.0967 0.0954 0.0926  
 
Table 6: Average inefficiency by ownership/subsidy type (TRE model) 
PUBLIC PRIVATE NON-PROFIT
PRIVATE
FOR-PROFIT TOTAL
SUBSIDIZED 0.0551 0.0586 0.0594 0.0565
NON SUBSIDIZED 0.0591 0.0605 0.0597
TOTAL 0.0551 0.0587 0.0598 0.0568  
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Table A.1: Total cost function with a GLS model with random effects 
 
 0.0125
 (0.0163)
 0.0154
 (0.0172)
 0.0488
 (0.0373)
 0.6238*  0.6227*
 (0.0168)  (0.0169)
 0.3914*  0.3926*
 (0.0195)  (0.0197)
 0.1467*  0.1485*
 (0.0098)  (0.0100)
 0.1202*  0.1216*
 (0.0091)  (0.0094)
 0.0300*  0.0292*
 (0.0127)  (0.0128)
 0.1719*  0.1719*
 (0.0299)  (0.0299)
 0.1472*  0.1459*
 (0.0197)  (0.0197)
 0.0600*  0.0615*
 (0.0159)  (0.0161)
 0.0839*  0.0790*
 (0.0362)  (0.0364)
 0.0826*  0.0818*
 (0.0102)  (0.0103)
-0.2867* -0.2933*
(0.0700) (0.0703)
 0.0481  0.0450
 (0.0294)  (0.0295)
 0.0162  0.0133
 (0.0158)  (0.0160)
 0.0260  0.0228
 (0.0255)  (0.0260)
-0.0305* -0.0313*
(0.0122) (0.0123)
-0.0121 -0.0118
(0.0086) (0.0086)
 0.0100  0.0097
 (0.0091)  (0.0091)
 0.0356*  0.0359*
 (0.0087)  (0.0087)
 0.0566*  0.0556*
 (0.0091)  (0.0092)
 0.0581*  0.0572*
 (0.0097)  (0.0098)
 1.2490*  1.2115*
 (0.2103)  (0.2116)
Model I Model II
Private For-Profit  -
Private Non-Profit
Subsidized
Number of hospitalizations 
(AP-DRG adjusted)
Average length of 
hospitalizations
Outpatient revenues
P K (capital price)     
P L  - physicians     
P L  - others         
Nurse per bed
Number of 
medical units
Fraction of training 
positions A and B
Emergency Room
Geriatrics
Number of 
non-medical units
Number of 
training positions
Fraction of 
ambulatory clinics
Fraction of medical units 
recognized by FMH
Year 2003
Constant
 -
 -
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
 
 
* Significant at 5% or less; Standard errors are given in parentheses; Dependent variable is 
 hospital's total costs; All variables except fractions and dummies are in logarithms. 
